Institutions, Equilibria and Efficiency Essays in Honor of Birgit Grodal /

Competition and efficiency is at the core of economic theory. This volume collects papers of leading scholars, which extend the conventional general equilibrium model in important ways: Efficiency and price regulation are studied when markets are incomplete and existence of equilibria in such settin...

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Bibliographic Details
Corporate Author: SpringerLink (Online service)
Other Authors: Schultz, Christian. (Editor, http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/edt), Vind, Karl. (Editor, http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/edt)
Format: Electronic eBook
Language:English
Published: Berlin, Heidelberg : Springer Berlin Heidelberg : Imprint: Springer, 2006.
Edition:1st ed. 2006.
Series:Studies in Economic Theory, 25
Subjects:
Online Access:https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-28161-4
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Table of Contents:
  • Birgit Grodal: A Friend to Her Friends
  • On the Definition of Differentiated Products in the Real World
  • Equilibrium Pricing of Derivative Securities in Dynamically Incomplete Markets
  • Adaptive Contracting: The Trial-and-Error Approach to Outsourcing
  • Monetary Equilibria over an Infinite Horizon
  • Do the Wealthy Risk More Money? An Experimental Comparison
  • Are Incomplete Markets Able to Achieve Minimal Efficiency?
  • A Competitive Model of Economic Geography
  • The Organization of Production, Consumption and Learning
  • Household Inefficiency and Equilibrium Efficiency
  • Equilibrium with Arbitrary Market Structure
  • Pareto Improving Price Regulation when the Asset Market is Incomplete
  • On Behavioral Heterogeneity
  • Learning of Steady States in Nonlinear Models when Shocks Follow a Markov Chain
  • The Evolution of Conventions under Incomplete Information
  • Group Formation with Heterogeneous Feasible Sets
  • Monotone Risk Aversion
  • Will Democracy Engender Equality?
  • Consumption Externalities, Rental Markets and Purchase Clubs
  • Core-Equivalence for the Nash Bargaining Solution.