Strategic Social Choice Stable Representations of Constitutions /
This monograph studies representations of effectivity functions by game forms that are at least Nash consistent, which means that they have a Nash equilibrium for any profile of preferences. In the second part the focus is on social choice functions that admit a strong Nash equilibrium resulting in...
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Main Authors: | , |
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Corporate Author: | |
Format: | Electronic eBook |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Berlin, Heidelberg :
Springer Berlin Heidelberg : Imprint: Springer,
2010.
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Edition: | 1st ed. 2010. |
Series: | Studies in Choice and Welfare,
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Subjects: | |
Online Access: | https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-13875-1 |
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