Strategic Social Choice Stable Representations of Constitutions /

This monograph studies representations of effectivity functions by game forms that are at least Nash consistent, which means that they have a Nash equilibrium for any profile of preferences. In the second part the focus is on social choice functions that admit a strong Nash equilibrium resulting in...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Peleg, Bezalel. (Author, http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/aut), Peters, Hans. (http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/aut)
Corporate Author: SpringerLink (Online service)
Format: Electronic eBook
Language:English
Published: Berlin, Heidelberg : Springer Berlin Heidelberg : Imprint: Springer, 2010.
Edition:1st ed. 2010.
Series:Studies in Choice and Welfare,
Subjects:
Online Access:https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-13875-1
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